Abstract-Kontek Industries (Kannapolis, NC) and their subsidiary, Stonewater Control Systems (Kannapolis, NC), have entered into a cooperative research and development agreement with Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, NM) to jointly develop and evaluate an integrated perimeter security solution, one that couples access delay with detection and assessment. This novel perimeter solution is designed to be sufficiently flexible for implementation at a wide range of facility types, from high security military or government installations to commercial power plants, to industrial facilities of various kinds. A prototype section of barrier has been produced and installed at the Sandia Exterior Intrusion Sensor Testing Facility in Albuquerque, NM. The prototype was implemented with a robust vehicle barrier and coupled with a variety of detection and assessment solutions to demonstrate both the effectiveness of such a solution, as well as the flexibility of the system. In this implementation, infrared sensors and fence disturbance sensors are coupled with a video motion detection sensor and ground sensors. The ability of the system to properly detect pedestrian or vehicle attempts to bypass, breach, or otherwise defeat the system will be characterized, as well as the Nuisance Alarm Rate.
I. Introduction
In today's security environment of increasingly varied threat scenarios, many high-security military and government installations which already have fully functional perimeter intrusion detection and assessment systems (PIDAS) are currently evaluating how to increase standoff for important assets, and incorporate extended detection beyond the current perimeter. Additionally, some lowand medium-security industrial installations, such as commercial power, petroleum, or chemical processing facilities which cannot afford a full PIDAS are investigating the need to incorporate increased detection capability at their existing perimeter. Some new facilities coming online may have need for a perimeter that can provide detection, threat assessment, and delay in one integrated system which does not require the intensive ground disturbance or protracted delays required by traditional PIDAS installation.
A traditional PIDAS installation, with the benefit of an animal control fence and engineered clear zone, serves as the benchmark against which the performance of other perimeter security systems will be compared. However, some applications as discussed above, Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
do not have the high performance requirements that would justify the expense of a full PIDAS. Other applications may have similar high-level requirements, but may require installation more immediately than possible with a full PIDAS. There exists an opportunity for a system flexible enough to meet the needs of these various customers, able to incorporate the varied sensor systems dictated by diverse facility requirements, and sufficiently configurable to provide higher performance in some installations, while allowing trade-offs to reduce cost or improve ease of installation in others. With careful selection of components and sophisticated softwarebased nuisance and false alarm detection techniques, such a modular approach to implementing perimeter security may even allow the customer to assemble a solution that approaches the high probability of detection (P d ) and low nuisance alarm rate (NAR) characteristic of a full PIDAS.
In this environment, Kontek Industries, Inc. (Kannapolis, NC) and their subsidiary, Stonewater Control Systems, Inc. (Kannapolis, NC), have entered into a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) with Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, NM) to jointly develop and evaluate an integrated perimeter security solution, one that couples access delay with detection and assessment. This novel perimeter solution was designed to be sufficiently flexible for implementation at a wide range of facility types, from high security military and government installations to commercial power plants to industrial facilities of various kinds. The underlying integration technology, derived from Stonewater's Control 1st and Energy 1st platforms, will allow this perimeter detection/assessment topology to be integrated with nearly any vehicle barrier, including an existing barrier installation, and coupled with any sensor technology necessary to meet the performance requirements and security regulations of a given site.
The ReKon TM system was the initial outcome of this collaboration. A prototype section, shown in Figure 1 , has been installed at the Sandia Exterior Sensor Testing Facility in Albuquerque, NM. The prototype system was implemented with a robust Sandiadesigned Modified Normandy Barrier (MNB), and coupled with a variety of detection and assessment solutions to demonstrate both the effectiveness of such a solution, as well as the flexibility of the system to incorporate a wide variety of inputs. In this prototype implementation, infrared sensors, fence disturbance sensors, and a fiber-optic break sensor are coupled with a video motion detection (VMD) sensor and a Sandia-designed ground sensor. The ability of the system to properly detect pedestrian or vehicle attempts to bypass, breach, or otherwise defeat the system will be 
II. Design Overview
The goal was to develop a highly capable system that can provide effective detection and assessment integrated with a barrier, for use outside an existing perimeter, or to provide a detection perimeter where none exists. Not all applications need the full P d of a PIDAS, nor can they afford the price tag. Thus, one of the primary design goals for the project is to develop a system that can be installed for less than the cost of a full PIDAS. The principal performance goals for the prototype system include: robust vehicle barrier, detection of vehicle impact, detection of personnel crossing the barrier, detection of breach attempts, detection of attempts to move or dislodge the barrier, tamper detection, and video assessment.
Additionally, the system should be modular and scalable. Each customer site will have different needs, and the system should be able to accommodate the sensors and assessment technology that best fulfill those needs. The ReKon TM system was designed as an enhanced integration system. It is sufficiently flexible to allow installation on various types of vehicle barriers, and integration of any available sensor, whether that sensor outputs XML, text, packed binary format protocols, analog voltage, or a dry contact closure. To achieve the modular goal, the prototype was designed to be self-contained as much as possible, such that a section of the system could be built off-site, and dropped into place with little onsite construction. To that end, a field distribution box was mounted directly to the barrier, and towers were integrated into the barrier design without need for separate foundations. The towers and FDB can be seen in Figure 1 . Although the integrated towers were not utilized in the performance testing discussed in this paper, they offer the capability of mounting cameras, illumination systems, or other equipment as desired.
A. Barrier
The barrier chosen for the prototype was the Modified Normandy Barrier (MNB) [1] , designed by Sandia National Laboratories. The intent of the ReKon TM system is to be barrier agnostic. Thus, while this barrier has been chosen for the prototype, it is not meant to indicate that only the MNB can be used with this system. The MNB was selected due to the high vehicle crash test rating (ASTM M50/P1) [2] , ability to install it with minimal digging, and current popularity with many customers due to the capability of a protective force to shoot through the barrier, making it ineffective for an adversary to hide behind the barrier. It has been crash-tested at Texas Transportation Institute (TTI), and achieved an M50/P1 rating when configured with in-ground bollard supports installed every 40 ft (12.2 m). Additionally, characterization of the barrier against both mechanical and explosive breaching has previously been conducted [1] .
B. Detection & Assessment
The test section included various complementary sensors to better evaluate the capability of the system to integrate multiple types of inputs. A diagram demonstrating how the sensors were arranged on and around the barrier is shown in Figure 2 .
LightLOC Express from Woven Electronics (Simpsonville, SC) is a fiber-optic break sensor that alarms when the light transmission loss through the fiber is greater than the set threshold. Essentially, it alarms when the fiber is broken or severely deformed. The cable was routed through fixed conduit mounted on the secure side of the barrier, to hold it securely and couple any deformation of the barrier to the fiber. LightLOC could be used alone for detection of vehicle impact or breaching attacks, however it will provide little or no detection of personnel attempting to cross the barrier.
The Intrepid MicroPoint II sensor from Southwest Microwave (Tempe, AZ) is a fence disturbance sensor. An 8 ft (2.44 m) chain link fence was mounted to the front of the barrier, as can be seen in Figure 1 , to enable installation of the MicroPoint according to the manufacturer's recommendations. The barrier was configured with a maintenance access pathway to mimic the needs of some installations which require breaks in outer perimeters for maintenance or patrol access. An infrared break-beam sensor, the Photon IR system from Deitech (Torino, Italy), was installed across this maintenance access. These sensors serve to provide detection against pedestrian attempts to climb over or under the vehicle barrier, or unauthorized access through the pathway. Thus, MicroPoint and Photon IR are mounted effectively in series, each protecting a different portion of perimeter (fenced vs maintenance access), and cannot be considered complementary. To provide complementary detection against pedestrian and vehicle threats, additional sensors are mounted off the barrier. A commerciallyavailable day/night high definition camera with integrated VMD was mounted on a mobile camera tower east of the barrier to enable full view of the entire test section and surrounding area. A full installation may have used one of the integrated towers for the camera mount, but the short length of this test section dictated the need for a remote tower to keep the entire test site in the field of view. Rapid Extended Defense System (REDS) [3] , a prototype seismic ground sensor system developed by Sandia National Laboratories, was installed in the ground on the unprotected (south) side of the barrier.
C. Software
The system software architecture reflects the physical barrier's use of modularity to adapt to diverse installation environments. Like the barrier, the software must be able to accept specialized sensor suites and fusion rules to match site conditions, and accommodate customer specific security policies and legacy system integration requirements. A major functional requirement of the system was to provide a convenient, unified platform to integrate, monitor, and manage disparate commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sensors. A significant problem with adding COTS sensors to a system is that each additional sensor increases the volume of nuisance alarms in the system. To address this problem, the software provides a plug-in framework to support implementing and evaluating different methods of sensor fusion to reduce NAR. Just as there is no onesize-fits-all solution to integrated perimeter defense, the choice of algorithms to reduce NAR will also need to be adjusted based on the complement of sensors chosen, threat analysis, and environmental conditions. A final high-level functional requirement was to supply interfaces and adapters for integrating with existing legacy or modern command and control infrastructures. Four high-level design criteria guided the architectural decisions: Interoperability, Extensibility, Scalability, and Security.
Interoperability means supporting integration in two directions: sensor-to-system integration and system-to-system integration.
Both directions require open, documented message exchange formats and application programming interface (API) contracts. Although there has been significant work to establish standardized message formats for sensors (SensorML, TransducerML, etc), few commercial sensors support these standards, and none of the sensors selected for the prototype system did. For sensor-tosystem integration, a sensor adapter layer is provided to transform the raw, proprietary sensor protocol data to an intermediate XML format. This format provides a common representation for sensor fusion logic as well as facilitates further transformation into formats understood by other external systems. To provide systemto-system level integration, external APIs and message formats were implemented in XML. This implementation was based on the Department of Defense (DoD) Security Equipment Integration Working Group (SEIWG) Interface Control Document for Command and Control Display Equipment Information Interchange [4] . SEIWG is a multi-service collaboration within DoD to develop and promote interoperability standards for physical security equipment vendors, with the ultimate goal of creating an environment where true plug-and-play systems integration is possible.
To promote system extensibility and interoperability, the system was designed according to the principles of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The core premise of SOA maintains that all components within a system should exist as independent services with documented APIs and message formats. Applications are then constructed as compositions of these services. Services can be altered without impacting the application as long as the API remains constant, and the application can be extended or modified by reconfiguring the composition of services without touching the services themselves. The composite nature of SOA applications also improves the scalability of the system. Since each component is built as an independent service, the system supports a true distributed computing paradigm where services can be relocated to new devices as their performance requirements increase.
The ReKon system can be configured to comply with stringent site security requirements through declarative security policy files. The use of policy files allows security policy changes to be made non-invasively, without any code changes to the system software. Security policies can be applied at the transport level with Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2, or at the message level via WS-Security 1.1 and WS-SecureConversation. Declarative policies provide the customer flexibility to decide what type of encryption and authentication the system should employ to meet facility requirements. Security policies can be executed at global enforcement points for all messages coming into or out of the system, or at local enforcement points for each system resource as it is requested. Any messages without a local or global policy authorizing it will be rejected.
D. Modular Software Design
The Application uses a Message Bus construct to combine services into a loosely coupled, event-driven architecture. The Message Bus creates a mediation layer that separates message producers and message consumers, providing a powerful abstraction for assembling applications out of multiple independent software modules. The Message Bus provides publish/subscribe semantics as well as lightweight orchestration of services into message processing pipelines. Additionally, the Message Bus offers a convenient location for the consistent enforcement of security policies.
E. Software System Capabilities
Adapters harvest real-time sensor input over a variety of communication media: RS-232/485, UDP, TCP, and HTTP. Each adapter converts the raw input into an intermediate XML format and sends it to the application Message Bus. The Message Bus publishes the message to authorized internal and external consumers (services). Internal consumers include a Logging Service which records every message for auditing and analysis; a SEIWG Conversion Service which understands how to transform all internal messages into their corresponding SEIWG representation; a Complex Event Processor for fusing message streams from the different sensors; a Rule Engine which executes actions based on rules concerning changes in system (including sensor) state; and a Relay Translation Service which converts XML alarm messages into relay outputs for communication to legacy annunciators. The system also contains a service for external consumers to manage their subscriptions to message topics. Messages can be dispatched to external services through a number of transports: SOAP, REST, HTTP/S, JMS, TCP, and UDP. Custom security policies can be applied for each external endpoint.
The Complex Event Processor subscribes to all message streams in the system and executes filters against those streams to select time windows over which the streams can be combined with various logic operators, producing aggregate, or complex, events which are fed back into the Message Bus. The Rule Engine maintains a continuously updating picture of the system's state and can trigger actions based on changes to the system, such as issuing an alarm report. The facts the Rule Engine maintains about the system, the rules it evaluates against those facts, and the resulting actions are all configurable by the user 
III. Individual Sensor Characterization
Performance testing was split into two categories: individual sensor characterization and system level performance. Individual sensor testing was necessary to characterize each sensor's strengths and weaknesses, which were used to define the systemlevel performance testing to follow. The threat was defined to be a walking, running, belly-crawling, or bear-crawling adversary with access to a vehicle. Single adversaries and groups of three were utilized. During performance testing, test path distances and intruder speeds were recorded along with timing information.
A. Individual Sensor Test Methods
Characterization tests were run on each sensor, except Light-LOC. It was tested only by simulating a break in the fiber or bending the fiber. During the characterization testing, various approach paths were used by the subjects to evaluate the sensors' response, as shown in Figure 4 . Each test path is numbered and referenced in the sections below.
Vehicle tests were conducted using two different methods. Unless otherwise specified, the tests were run using the "Start/Stop" method, which refers to the stopping of the vehicle on the test bed, just before reaching the barrier fence. Continuous Movement, as referenced in the table III and IV by "Cont.", refers to driving through the maintenance access. For all vehicle testing, Polaris refers to a Polaris Ranger 2-seat ATV 4x4, while Minivan refers to a Dodge Caravan.
1) Photon: The Photon IR sensor was tuned to ensure an adversary could not crawl under the bottom beam, or run through faster than the phasing of the beams. Testing included walking, running, and crawling subjects attempting to pass through the Photon IR sensor array undetected.
2) MicroPoint: MicroPoint testing consisted of subjects climbing the fence, as well as simulating cuts to the fence. There were a total of six poles tested when climbing, referenced as P1 -P6 in Figure 4 , where the subject would climb on the fence at the pole location. When conducting fabric climb tests, the test subjects climbed on the fabric between poles 1-6 and an additional fabric panel adjacent to pole 1. For all climbing tests, the subject would climb to the top of the fence and hold position at the top for a couple of seconds. The cut tests consisted of performing no more than eight simulated cuts, 1-2 seconds between cuts, in a pattern which would form an opening at the bottom of the fence fabric. Due to the installation of a taut cable through the bottom of the fabric, no significant movement of the fabric was possible, and thus attempts to bypass the fence by lifting the fabric off the ground were not explored.
3) REDS: The REDS sensors were arranged with four sensor nodes configured with the footstep detection algorithm, and four with the vehicle detection algorithm. Detections on REDS were defined to include triggering by both the footstep and vehicle detection algorithms during the test attempts. In evaluating the REDS data, it should again be noted it is a prototype system, and is not yet a commercially-fieldable system. REDS data was monitored during the running, crawling, and vehicle tests already being performed for VMD, discussed below.
4) VMD:
Testing for the VMD system was conducted both in color and monochrome mode, always in the daytime. No testing was performed at night due to illuminator malfunction and project schedule. This specific VMD system did not require any initial calibration or algorithm training other than setting up user-defined rules, which were configured to alarm whenever any object classified as a person or vehicle was detected within a 6 ft (1.8 m) zone defined immediately south of the chain link fence. As image contrast can have a significant effect on VMD performance, the effect of contrast was evaluated by varying the color of clothing worn by the subjects, to contrast with the sandy soil in the test field. Thus, testing was performed at three clothing contrast levels, defined as H = high (bright white), M = medium (dark green), and L = low (light tan).
B. Individual Sensor Results
The effectiveness of a sensor against a specific attack method in a given environment is most commonly measured with the probability of detection (P d ), calculated with a confidence interval over the binomial distribution [5] . Tables I, II, III, and IV However, when the test subject stood up after completing the bear crawl tests and walked back to the start, it alarmed nine out of ten times. This suggests that once the adversary approaches the barrier, they would need to remain low to the ground to bypass the sensor. VMD performed poorly at detecting runs at a 45
• angle to the camera view (paths 2-7), although it did very well on runs in other paths. It also performed poorly against vehicles approaching the barrier tangentially. Based on observations, this is due to the size of the vehicle and limited time traveling through the field of view of the camera. It was observed that VMD performed better when the vehicle traveled radially in or out of the field of view. Results indicated the alarm signaling response time was faster in monochrome mode (76 ms average) than color mode (212 ms average). VMD also performed better against the Polaris vehicle in monochrome than it did in color mode. It is clear that more indepth testing should be conducted to determine how monochrome mode handles the other adversary approaches. REDS performed poorly detecting a bear-crawling adversary. It is believed that this is due to four points of contact with the ground and that it does not generate the same level of activity seen during walking, running, or belly crawling. Table V shows the summary of the real alarm count and the nuisance and false alarm rates (NAR/FAR) for each sensor over the period from May -July 2012. The NAR/FAR are defined as the number of alarms per day over this period. For the purpose of this work, a real alarm is when the video assessment can verify that either a human or vehicle caused the alarm. A nuisance alarm is tallied when the source of the alarm is identified as something other than human or vehicle, such as sage brush or a rabbit. A false alarm is classified as one where the source of the alarm cannot be verified through the video assessment. It should be noted that the chain link fence was intentionally not tightened as required per traditional security perimeter standards in order to test MicroPoint performance, as MicroPoint claimed their system could be installed on nearly any quality of fence. Although the NAR is low, the FAR is fairly high, and is likely indicative of wind disturbance. Correlation of weather conditions with these alarms would likely result in identification of more alarm sources, resulting in reclassifying some of the false alarms as nuisance. All Photon IR nuisance alarms were verified to be rabbits. While the REDS footstep algorithm had no nuisance alarms and a fairly low FAR, the vehicle algorithm had a fairly high FAR. Some of this may be attributable to the early development stage of the vehicle algorithm, compared to the much more advanced footstep algorithm. It is also known that helicopters flying overhead will trigger a REDS vehicle alarm, and there is significant helicopter traffic in that area. Additionally, the test site sits proximal to an explosives test range, which undoubtedly caused several unidentifiable (false) alarms.
IV. Integrated System Testing

A. System Test Methods
After characterizing each sensor against simple adversary behaviors, more complex methods were explored to attempt to bypass the entire system of sensors. The individual sensor characterization tests addressed detection on single-method approach paths to the barrier. However, a successful adversary will do more than simply approach the barrier. The ReKon TM system allows integration of multiple complementary sensors to combined their effectiveness. Thus, the integrated system testing will recreate actions necessary to bypass all the sensors, in an attempt to cross the barrier undetected. There are essentially six fundamental ways to cross the barrier: bridge over the barrier, tunnel under the barrier, climb over the fence, cut through the fence, travel through the maintenance access, or drive a vehicle through the barrier. The latter, a vehicle impact test, was not conducted during this effort. Based on the findings in section III-B, the monochrome mode was used for VMD during system testing, otherwise all other sensors were tested as configured during sensor characterization. The following tests were conducted for the system: 1) Bridging Attempts: All bridging attempts conducted without vehicles involved the subjects carrying a ladder to the barrier, then setting up and climbing the ladder to simulate a jump over the fence or Photon IR sensor. Tests with vehicles involved driving the vehicle close to the barrier, climbing to the roof, and simulating the actions of jumping over the fence from the vehicle roof.
• Three walking subjects cloaked with tarp (path 1)
• Three walking subjects, shoulder-to-shoulder (path 1)
• Three walking subjects cloaked with styrofoam door, shoulderto-shoulder (path 1) • Bear-crawling subject, dragging ladder (path 1)
• Drive golf cart to barrier (paths 1, 9)
• Drive Ford F-350 truck to barrier (paths 1, 9)
2) Tunneling Attempts: The test subjects used hand trowels to tunnel under the barrier, except in one attempt, where a shovel was used as noted. Although the soil at the test site is all compacted dirt, some of the tunneling tests were conducted on a loose soil condition by digging out a hole and backfilling with loose soil, to better approximate digging in sandy conditions.
• Three walking subjects, cloaked with rigid tarp (8 ft x 10 ft), digging with shovel (path 1)
• Three bear crawling subjects, cloaked with tarp (path 1)
• Three subjects walking in group (path 1)
• Bear-crawling subject (paths 1,8)
3) Climbing Attempts:
• Walking subject climbs the fence 4) Cutting Attempts:
• Walking subject cloaked with styrofoam door cuts through fence fabric
• Walking subject with backpack cut through fence fabric 5) Maintenance Access Attempts:
• Walking subject • Running subject
• Bear-crawling subject • Belly-crawling subject
B. System Test Results
Table VI summarizes the system testing results. The System Detections/Repetitions column scores a detection for a trial if even only one of the four sensors alarmed during the test attempt. The last four columns show how each sensor responded to each approach method. All personnel wore low-contrast clothing during system tests unless noted otherwise. On the Tunneling bear crawl, dig loose soil attempt on path 10, and on the Maintenance Access walk attempt, no results were recorded for REDS since the logging system failed. Technical difficulties also prohibited collection of REDS data during the Cutting walking with backpack attempt. The discrepancy in number of repetitions for the Maintenance Access run and belly crawl (M contrast) attempts were due to logging errors rendering the data unrecoverable.
The system detected all bridging attempts. Once the adversary reaches the barrier, VMD is the only remaining sensor to be bypassed. VMD detected the subjects climbing the ladder as soon as the subject's body peaked the top of the ladder. It was observed that to confound the system, camouflaging methods would need to be incorporated into the bridging attempts. Results indicate the worst case for VMD detection is a large rigid surface used to disguise the adversary. During the 3 subject walk with tarp attempt at 5 ft/s, it was noted that VMD did not alarm until the subject climbed the ladder and peaked the top; however, the REDS sensor detected them early in the approach, possibly due to increased noise generation coupled to the ground. The system detected all tunneling attempts. REDS detected all attempts except the loose soil tests. VMD complemented most all the detections except during the bear crawl with tarp attempt, and when the tarp was stretched to 8 ft x 10 ft to increase rigidity, decreasing tarp movement. The other adversarial advantage to using any method where the subject is hidden by an object is that all additional movement after the adversary has reached the barrier is undetectable by VMD, unless some object loitering rule is implemented. The system detected all climbing and cutting attempts. During one attempt, a backpack was used to simulate an adversary carrying tools to aide in the intrusion attempt, although results indicate the backpack does not reduce the VMD detection capabilities. The system detected all maintenance access attempts. The bear crawl represents the worst case for both VMD and REDS, so the Photon IR is essentially the single line of detection for these attempts; however, the P d of Photon IR is high, even on its own. VMD struggled to detect belly crawls, while REDS performed well against the belly crawls. In all the Maintenance Access attempts, Photon IR sensed all intrusions.
The methodology used to select the bypass methods used in the system testing was described in section IV-A. The methods used to approach the barrier were based on the collective weaknesses of all the sensors. The sensor characterization results indicate that it is possible to bypass either REDS or VMD with the approach methods indicated to arrive at the fence, and, as mentioned previously, bridging or tunneling should be sufficient to bypass the MicroPoint or Photon IR. Thus, when the adversary reaches the barrier, it would be necessary to either bridge or tunnel since cutting the fence, climbing over the fence, or walking through the maintenance access are not advisable paths for covert conveyance. However, VMD and REDS collectively performed very well against the bridging and tunneling attacks, again confirming the importance of utilizing complementary sensors with line detection sensors. While there were weaknesses in several of the individual sensors, the ability to incorporate multiple complementary sensors enabled the integrated system to perform much better. Unfortunately, sufficient test data at the system level was not available at the time of this report to calculate P d for direct comparison to the individual sensor performance, but a simple comparison of the "detections/repetitions" data is nonetheless illustrative. As previously mentioned, however, when a system simply involves adding several different sensors, the P d may go up, but the NAR/FAR will certainly go up, unless something is done to counter that. In the evaluation above, the system was considered ''successful'' if even one sensor detected the subject. However, such a simple combination with no intelligence or filtering also results in counting each nuisance and false alarm from every sensor. From Table V , this would result in the integrated system having a reasonable NAR of 0.46/day, but an significant FAR of 5.9/day. This would typically be considered unacceptable for high-security applications. While some measures could be taken to reduce this, such as correlating the assessment with the weather data, additional measures should be taken to reduce the NAR/FAR but still maintain acceptable detection performance.
V. Sensor Fusion Demonstration
In addition to the individual and system testing, a demonstration of sensor fusion capabilities was conducted. Two approaches to sensor fusion were evaluated. The first approach used logical inference to fuse logic states output by the individual sensors by considering coincident events over a time window. The second approach applied statistical machine learning techniques to more detailed assessment data extracted from the sensors after the fact (except for VMD, this data is not made available by the other sensor vendors as part of their online communication protocols), along with one minute averaged weather data available from a local weather station. Due to some equipment malfunction there was not always a full complement of sensor data for all the alarm events under consideration. The experiment evaluated the results of combining REDS and VMD alarms with Photon IR and MicroPoint alarms to eliminate nuisance alarms from Photon IR and MicroPoint.
A. Data Fusion Methods
The dataset for both tests contained 906 total alarm events recorded from both MicroPoint and Photon IR. The 906 events were manually sorted into 640 real alarms and 266 nuisance alarms. The following statistics were gathered to measure the effectiveness of each approach:
• True Positives: count of real alarms predicted as real alarms • False Positives: count of nuisance alarms predicted as real alarms
• False Negative: count of real alarms predicted as nuisance alarms
• True Negatives: count of nuisance alarms predicted as nuisance alarms
• Precision: % positive predictions that were correct T rueP ositives T rueP ositives + F alseP ositives
• Recall: % real alarms caught T rueP ositives T rueP ositives + F alseN egatives
• Specificity: % negative predictions that were accurate (nuisance alarms properly classified)
T rueN egatives T rueN egatives + F alseP ositives
The methodology for the logical inference fusion experiment was to configure the Complex Event Processor to aggregate alarm events from VMD or REDS that signify human or vehicle detected and correlate them separately with either Photon IR or MicroPoint alarms over a 15 second window of time. The correlation events were then sent to the Rule Engine where a positive correlation would trigger the generation of an alarm event. The system was then set to run live against real data as it was generated by test intrusions and real environmental nuisances. The machine learning approach was evaluated offline because the more detailed sensor data it required was not available online, and also because of the need to acquire a dataset large enough to both train the system and evaluate its performance. Additionally, in order to assess the contribution of each sensor to the overall effectiveness of the machine learning classifier, a ceiling analysis was performed by generating separate datasets with different sensor combinations and evaluating the machine learning results using each dataset individually:
• pir_w: Photon IR with weather only The dataset was randomized and split into 60% training data and 40% test evaluation data. For each dataset above, the machine learning algorithm was then trained on the training data and its prediction performance evaluated with the separate test dataset. Since the dataset was small and performance would vary based on which test cases did not have a corollary in the training data, each dataset was run through 200 training iterations, each time randomizing the data, retraining the classifier, and measuring its performance against the new test dataset. After the last iteration, the values of precision, recall, and specificity were calculated for a 95% confidence interval [5] . The evaluation results, shown in Table VII reveal obvious weaknesses in sensor fusion using logical inference, and significant promise in the application of machine learning to the problem domain. For both tests, the results are skewed somewhat by the absence of some sensor data due to equipment malfunction, but it is clear that machine learning is significantly more resilient in the face of sensor loss. The test data was not scrubbed for records that could be deemed questionable, such as events that are consistently false negative even though they are bracketed on both sides by positive identifications a few seconds apart (this would happen when large groups of people were inspecting the fence), or when the barrier sensors were undergoing maintenance and would have normally been placed into access mode. For the machine learning experiment, most if not all the false negatives can be accounted for by these circumstances. However, any sensor fusion system for perimeter security clearly should sacrifice precision for recall when tuning the algorithm. While the various machine learning sensor combinations achieved excellent recall with probability from 93.5-97.6%, the significantly lower probability of the recall score posted by logical inference (76.8%) indicates that it is not able to combine the sensors without combining their weaknesses as well, and overall results in a measurably weaker system than one that considers each sensor individually.
The machine learning ceiling analysis reveals that the largest contributors to correct nuisance classification (specificity) are the VMD for Photon IR, and weather for MicroPoint. Largely this is because these sensors provide the most detailed stream of information. REDS provided significant improvement to the effectiveness of machine learning with the Photon IR dataset, but since REDS really provides only truth state values regarding detection, its contribution was overshadowed by that of VMD. Similarly, the combination of weather data with MicroPoint proved so effective, there was little room for REDS to make a contribution with the limited data it provides. VMD did experience some trouble discerning subjects standing flush to the fence. A number of false negatives occurred while MicroPoint was being tuned (e.g. in maintenance mode), such that the subject would trigger an alarm without approaching the fence (the subject was already there). Without an approach to the fence neither REDS nor VMD had a chance to identify the subject. Overall, machine learning displayed outstanding results with the ability to correctly classify nuisance alarms 67% of the time in most cases, and almost 98% of the time with the best sensor combinations, and still maintain excellent recall for true alarms. Correct classification of nuisance alarms enables the system with multiple options, such as forwarding them to the alarm station labeled as nuisance or lower priority, or not forwarding them at all, depending on the security policies in place. Most if not all false negatives can be explained by sensor malfunction, situations with other alarms already present, or the system undergoing maintenance.
Although the machine learning approach was evaluated with offline datasets, this was only done because the required data could not be extracted from the sensors in real-time. If the sensors did provide this information live, then it would have been a simple exercise to add a machine learning prediction service to the existing software architecture. The Complex Event Processor already supports aggregating and transforming multple sensor feeds into new data formats, which can be published for processing by the prediction service. In fact, it is envisioned that machine learning prediction will be just one facet of a multi-layered approach to NAR reduction that will combine heuristics, statistical analysis and logical inference to reduce the likelihood of false negatives. The ReKon TM software architecture was developed to make the expression of such concepts straightforward through service composition.
VI. Conclusion
A system has been demonstrated that can integrate various types of sensor inputs, which allows for incorporation of userspecified algorithms to further filter the data if desired. The suite of sensors chosen for this prototype demonstration will not work for all sites, but was only chosen for the purposes of this demonstration. It could be envisioned that a site might only have need for detection against vehicle impact threats, and have no requirements for pedestrian threats. Or, perhaps specific terrain at another facility might render certain types of sensors less useful. A perimeter defense system must be customizable to the unique conditions of each installation site in order to provide the most secure solution matching the customer's requirements. To permit customization, the product must be modular and allow the solution to be assembled from the best selection of components. Similarly, the software platform for integrating sensors must also be highly flexible and modular to expedite the process of bringing together the best sensors for a given threat environment as well as support integration into existing security technology infrastructure. However, deploying multiple sensor systems on the perimeter significantly increases the amount of false and nuisance alarms security personnel must respond to. The software platform must also provide a framework for reducing false and nuisance alarms by plugging in different sensor fusion methods that are best suited to the installation environment. The ReKon TM system has been designed to meet all these requirements.
A frequent criticism of sensor fusion as applied to physical security is that combining sensors together combines their weakness as well as their strengths. Often this produces conditions in which an adversary only needs to exploit vulnerabilities in one sensor in order to defeat the whole assembly. While this situation is true, it clearly produces a less capable detection system than when all sensor inputs are evaluated individually. Conversely, if each sensor is evaluated individually, the overall volume of nuisance and false alarms can increase by a multiple of the number of sensors in the system. The ideal fusion scenario is the one which emphasizes each sensor's strengths while mitigating its weaknesses. Weakness, in this case, means either reporting a situation as an alarm when it is not, or not reporting an alarm when there is one. To compensate for a sensor's weaknesses, a sensor fusion algorithm needs to know under what conditions a sensor's performance is error prone, which requires a sensor to supply additional information regarding its decision-making inputs. The test results show that logical inference is too simple, and may produce a system with lower P d than a system without fusion, whereas the machine learning approach can produce a system with comparable P d to a system without fusion, yet eliminates many of the nuisance alarms to which such a system is susceptible. The current accepted approach to reducing NAR in an intrusion detection system is to reduce the sensitivity of individual sensors until an acceptable compromise is found between P d and the volume of nuisance alarms generated. It is hypothesized that the effectiveness of the machine learning approach in reducing NAR will alter this tradeoff to permit tuning sensors to higher levels of sensitivity, thereby increasing the system's overall probability of detection.
The promising results motivate the continued work in this line of research. It would be worthwhile to continue this work by evaluating additional sensor types, perhaps focusing on sensors that will provide additional detection against threats of bridging over a barrier, or tunneling underneath, and enhancing the fusion algorithms to minimize the NAR from those sensors. Enabling the system and sensors to run the machine learning algorithms live should also be a focus, and performing sensor characterization and system bypass testing on the live system, verifying the results found in this study by post-processing the sensor data through the algorithms. Additional testing in nighttime and winter conditions would also allow a more thorough evaluation of the NAR-reduction capabilities of the machine learning process.
